A seminal theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proves that, in a game of bilateral trade between a single buyer and a single seller, no mechanism can be simultaneously individually-rational, budget-balanced, incentive-compatible and socially-efficient. However, the impossibility disappears if the price is fixed exogenously and the social-efficiency goal is subject to individual-rationality at the given price.
Introduction
Consider a market with two agents: a seller and a buyer. The seller holds an item for sale and the buyer considers buying this item. The seller values the item as s and the buyer values it as b. The utilities of both agents are quasilinear in money. If s < b then there is a potential gain-from-trade (GFT) -if the seller sells the item to the buyer then the social welfare will increase by b − s. We look for a mechanism that asks the agents to report their values and implements this optimal GFT. The mechanism should satisfy four properties:
• Efficiency -the increase in social welfare should be max(0, b − s).
• Budget balance (BB) -the mechanism designer should not lose.
• Individual rationality (IR) -the utility of each agent should not decrease.
• Dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility (DSIC) -it should be a weaklydominant strategy for each agent to report his true value.
It is easy to construct mechanisms that satisfy each three of these four properties. However, a classic paper of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proves that it is impossible to satisfy all four properties simultaneously. Intuitively, the reason is that it is impossible to truthfully determine prices for trading: if the mechanism pays the seller p s < b, the seller is incentivized to bid e.g. (p s + b)/2 to force the price up; similarly, if the mechanism charges the buyer p b > s, the buyer is incentivized to bid (p b + s)/2 to force the price down. DSIC can be guaranteed by setting p s = b and p b = s (this is the two-sided variant of the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961) ) but this mechanism is not BB since it leaves the mechanism designer with a deficit of b − s. Now consider a market in which a price p is fixed exogenously, e.g. by the government. Fixing a price automatically guarantees budget-balance, since all monetary transfers are between buyers and sellers. We are interested in incentive-compatibility and efficiency subject to individual-rationality, i.e, we want the buyer to buy the item if-and-only-if b ≥ p ≥ s. In this case the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility disappears. It is trivial to attain all these properties using the following simple mechanism: ask the agents to report their values and perform the trade iff b ≥ p ≥ s.
But this trivial mechanism works only when there is a single unit of a single good. We are interested in the following question:
In a market with a single buyer, a single seller and two or more items with exogenously-fixed prices, is it possible to attain incentivecompatibility and efficiency subject to individual-rationality?
Our main result is that this is impossible. We quantify the impossibility using the notion of a competitive ratio of a mechanism -the worst-case ratio of its GFT to the optimal GFT. We present three upper bounds on the competitive ratio:
1. If the seller holds M different kinds of goods and the buyer wants one good, then the competitive ratio of any DSIC mechanism is at most 1/M .
2. If the seller holds M units of the same good, then the competitive ratio of any DSIC mechanism is at most 1/M .
3. If the seller holds M units of the same good, and it is public knowledge that both the seller and the buyer have submodular valuations (decreasing marginal returns), then the competitive ratio of any DSIC mechanism is at most 1/H M , where H M is the M -th harmonic number (H M ≈ ln M +1/2).
All these upper bounds are tight: they are attained by trivial mechanisms that ignore the agents' bids and determine the trade randomly. The results are proved as special cases of a general model about bilateral cooperation. This model is presented in Section 2. The results on cooperation with general valuations are proved in Section 3. The result on cooperation with submodular valuations is proved in Section 4. The corollaries to bilateral trading are proved in Section 5.
Model
There are two agents that we call "buyer" and "seller". They consider M options for cooperation, numbered 1, . . . , M . If option i is selected, then the buyer's utility is b i and the seller's utility is s i , which can be positive zero or negative. These utilities are their private information. Additionally, there is an option 0 which means no cooperation; we assume that b 0 = s 0 = 0.
An outcome i is called feasible if both b i ≥ 0 and s i ≥ 0. Denote the set of feasible outcomes by Feasible:
Note that Feasible(b, s) is never empty since it contains 0.
The optimal utility of a feasible outcome is denoted by OPT:
Bilateral trade is a special case of this general model. 
and OPT is again the maximum potential GFT.
Our goal is to design a mechanism that approximates OPT.
A mechanism is a function r that receives as input the reported valuations of the agents,
, is a vector of M + 1 probabilities -a probability for each option including option 0. The probability of option i is denoted by r i (b ′ , s ′ ), and
The expected gain of the buyer is:
and the expected gain of the seller is:
and the expected gain of the mechanism is: 
If the mechanism r is DSIC, we assume that b ′ = b and s ′ = s, so the mechanism gain is G r (b, s). The competitive ratio of a DSIC mechanism is:
General utilities
Consider the following simple mechanism.
Example 3.1. The Uniform-Random (UR) mechanism chooses an option i ∈ {1, . . . , M } with uniform probability, r i = 1/M for all i, regardless of b ′ and s ′ . It then lets the agents decide whether they want option i or nothing. The agents will cooperate iff b i ≥ 0, s i ≥ 0. Therefore, the expected gain is
This lower bound is tight, since it is possible that that all positive gain comes from a single option. Therefore, C UR = 1/M .
Our first theorem shows that, when the agents can have general utility functions, no DSIC mechanism can be better than the uniform-random mechanism.
Theorem 3.2. When there are M options, every DSIC mechanism has an expected competitive ratio of at most 1/M .
The following lemma will be used several times in the proof.
Lemma 3.3. Let r be a DSIC mechanism with competitive ratio α. Then, for every b, s:
. If the true values are (b ′ , s), then almost all gain comes from the buyer's values, so:
Since the competitive ratio is α, we must have
Dividing both sides by L yields:
If the buyer's true valuations are b but he reports b ′ , his expected gain is exactly the left-hand side of (*). Therefore, a DSIC mechanism must guarantee that the buyer gets the same utility by reporting truthfully b. Hence:
as claimed. The proof for the seller is analogous.
We now apply Lemma 3.3 to utility vectors from a special family. For every d ∈ {1, . . . , M }, let B d be the family of vectors b with:
For every constant ε ≪ 1, let s ε be a vector with:
Lemma 3.4. Let r be a DSIC mechanism with competitive ratio α. Then, for every d, every b ∈ B d and every ε ∈ (0, 1):
Proof. The proof is by induction on d.
For d = 1, we have b 1 = 1 and all other b i 's are zero or negative. Apply Lemma 3.3 to the buyer:
We now assume the claim is true for d − 1 and prove it is true for d. Let b be any vector in B d . Consider the alternative buyer's valuation b ′ , with:
So the gain in options d + 1, . . . , M is dominated by −1/ε M . We claim that the probability with which the mechanism selects one of these options is negligible.
. Then, when the true valuations are b ′ , s ε :
If the competitive ratio of r is positive, then G r must be positive, which implies r D < ε M . Now, apply Lemma 3.3 to the seller :
Note that b ′ ∈ B d−1 . Hence, by the induction assumption:
Summing the above two inequalities gives:
If the buyer's true valuation is b but he deviates and reports b ′ , he is guaranteed a utility of at least d · (α − 2ε). Therefore, a DSIC mechanism must guarantee the buyer at least the same utility from reporting truthfully b. Hence:
verifying the induction claim for d.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Apply Lemma 3.4 with d = M . It implies that every DSIC mechanism with approximation factor at least α must have
But the sum of all M probabilities must be at most 1. Therefore, α ≤ 1/M + 2ε. This is true for every ε ∈ (0, 1), so α ≤ 1/M .
Submodular utilities
In this section, we assume that the utility vectors of both agents satisfy the condition of decreasing marginal returns, which is equivalent to submodularity: Definition 4.1. A utility vector v 1 , . . . , v M is submodular if, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1}:
In the case of multi-unit bilateral trade (Example 2.1), it is clear that if the buyer's utility function β i is submodular, then his utility vector b i is submodular too. It can be checked that the same is true for the seller: if σ i is submodular then s i is submodular too. We now present a randomized mechanism for submodular agents.
Example 4.2. The Decreasing Random (DR) mechanism chooses each option i ∈ {1, . . . , M } with probability:
where H M is the M -th harmonic number:
It then lets the agents decide whether they want option i or nothing. The agents will cooperate iff b i ≥ 0, s i ≥ 0. Therefore, the expected gain is:
Suppose both the buyer and the seller have submodular utilities. Let v i := b i + s i . Then the vector v i is submodular too, and this implies that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , M }:
Therefore, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , M }:
This is true in particular for the option k in which OPT is attained. Therefore,
This inequality is tight. For example, we might have, for all i, b i = i and s i = 0 (both are submodular). Then, the optimal gain is M while
Our next theorem shows that, even when the agents' utilities are known to be submodular, no DSIC mechanism can be better than the decreasing-random mechanism.
Theorem 4.3. When there are M options, every DSIC mechanism that works for arbitrary submodular valuations has an expected competitive ratio of at most 1/H M .
We will prove the theorem by applying Lemma 3.3 to utility vectors from a special family. For every d ∈ {1, . . . , M }, let B d * be the family of submodular vectors b with:
Let s * be a vector with: s * i = i for all i (note that s * is submodular too).
Lemma 4.4. Let r be a DSIC mechanism with competitive ratio α. Then, for every d and for every b ∈ B d * :
Proof. The proof is by induction on d. 
where ε is a very small number. By arguments similar to Lemma 3.4, when ε is sufficiently small, any mechanism with positive competitive ratio must select
Bilateral Trade
In this section we prove two corollaries of Theorem 3.2 for two settings of bilateral trading. 
Remark 5.2. Obviously there are special cases in which Corollary 5.1 does not hold. For example, if it is public knowledge that the utilities of both the buyer and the seller are additive (i.e, β i = i · β 1 and σ i = i · σ 1 for all i), then the following mechanism is DSIC: ask the agents to report β 1 and σ 1 ; trade M units iff β 1 ≥ p ≥ σ 1 . Remark 5.4. Corollary 5.3 holds even if it is public knowledge that the seller has an additive valuation function. However, it does not hold if both the seller and the buyer are additive. In this case, it is possible to trade in each item-type separately using a simple mechanism: trade iff β i ≥ p i ≥ σ i .
Conclusion
We presented impossibility theorems on impossibility of truthful cooperation in general. Applying these theorems to Examples 2.1 and 2.2 yields impossibility results on bilateral trade with fixed prices.
Our general results about impossibility of cooperation can potentially be extended in two ways.
1. We assumed that the mechanism is not allowed to charge money -so it must be strongly-budget-balanced. What happens if we allow the mechanism to charge or pay money, but require that it remains weakly-budget-balanced (no deficit)? 2. We required the mechanism to be dominant-strategy IC. What happens if we allow it to be IC only in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, like the original theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ?
The applications to bilateral trade can also be extended. Suppose there are M different kinds of goods and the buyer is not unit-demand? If the valuations are arbitrary, then our general impossibility implies that the competitive ratio can be at most 1/2 M . What is the upper bound when the agents' valuations are sub-additive? sub-modular? gross-substitute?
